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Abstract
The hospital market is served by firms that are private for-profit, private not-for-profit, and
government-owned and operated. I use a plausibly exogenous change in hospital financing that was
intended to improve medical care for the poor to test three theories of organizational behavior. I find
that the critical difference between the three types of hospitals is caused by the soft budget constraint
of government-owned institutions. The decision-makers in private not-for-profit hospitals are just
as responsive to financial incentives and are no more altruistic than their counterparts in profitmaximizing facilities. My final set of results suggests that the significant increase in public medical
spending examined in this paper has not improved health outcomes for the indigent.
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I. Introduction
The hospital market is served by firms that are private for-profit, private not-for-profit, and
publicly-owned and operated. In this paper, I examine how a hospital’s type of ownership
influences its response to profitable opportunities that are created by changes in government policy.
The policy change that I exploit was designed to improve the quality of medical care for low-income
individuals by significantly increasing hospitals’ financial incentives to treat them. This program
also substantially increased the revenues of those hospitals that had been serving a disproportionate
share of the indigent. I use this plausibly exogenous change in government policy to test three
different theories of organizational behavior, and then to assess the impact of hospital behavioral
responses on health outcomes.
The response of organizations to changes in government policy will have an important
impact on the consequences of these policies. This is likely to be especially true in the medical
sector, in which the federal, state, and local governments contract directly with hospitals, nursing
homes, and other health care organizations to provide medical care to the elderly, the poor, and the
disabled. Whether a particular policy change will have the intended effect depends critically on the
reactions of those for-profit, not-for-profit, and public institutions with which the government
contracts.
One theory of organizational behavior argues that the ease with which a firm’s decision
makers can appropriate profits is the critical difference between private for-profit, private not-forprofit, and public firms. Private not-for-profit organizations are barred from distributing profits to
individuals who exercise control over the firm [Hansmann 1980]. Employee compensation in
government-owned firms is even more strictly regulated [Wilson 1989]. According to this first
theory, if these constraints on compensation are much more stringent than those in profitmaximizing firms, then not-for-profit and government-owned hospitals will be relatively insensitive
to changes in the financial incentive to treat low-income individuals.
3

An alternative theory predicts that organizations differ primarily because of the individuals
who choose to work in each type of firm. Previous work on not-for-profit firms has emphasized the
altruistic nature of their decision-makers [Rose-Ackerman 1996] and their deviation from profitmaximizing behavior [Lakdawalla-Philipson 1998]. Managers in government-owned institutions
have been characterized as having a strong sense of mission [Wilson 1989], aiming to maximize the
well-being of the people served by their organizations. If the decision-makers in not-for-profit and
government-owned hospitals have more altruistic motives than their counterparts in for-profit
organizations, then this second theory suggests that they will be more inclined to use cash windfalls
to improve medical care for the poor.
A third theory of organizational behavior claims that public firms differ substantially from
both types of private firms because of their soft budget constraint [Kornai 1980]. Given that public
hospitals are typically owned by another government entity, they may have much weaker financial
incentives than do private institutions. Local governments could, for example, reduce their subsidies
to public hospitals one-for-one as these facilities’ revenues increase. This theory predicts that public
hospitals will be relatively insensitive to changes in the profitability of patients, and that local
governments will take any increased revenues that public hospitals receive.
I use a plausibly exogenous change in government policy to test each of these theories of
organizational behavior.

In 1990, the California state government created a program that

significantly increased hospitals’ financial incentives to treat indigent patients by transferring vast
sums of money to hospitals that would provide a disproportionate amount of care to the poor. The
effect of the Disproportionate Share Program (DSH) differed across hospitals because of the nonlinear incentives that it created. Specifically, a hospital received no money from the program if only
a small percentage of its patients were indigent. But if a facility’s “low-income number” reached
a threshold of 25 percent, the hospital received substantial funds, with the size of the hospital’s DSH
payment increasing as its percentage rose above 25 percent.
4

My first set of findings reveals that both types of private hospitals were significantly more
responsive than public facilities to the DSH incentives. After the DSH program took effect, private
for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals cream-skimmed the most profitable indigent patients from
public facilities while continuing to avoid the unprofitable ones. The observable reaction of forprofit and not-for-profit hospitals was quite similar, while government-owned hospitals were
unresponsive to the change in incentives. This result leads me to reject the first hypothesis, which
predicts that private not-for-profit hospitals should be less responsive than profit-maximizing firms
to changes in financial incentives.
In my second set of empirical results, I explore how private for-profit, private not-for-profit,
and publicly-owned hospitals used the increased revenues they received from the DSH program.
My findings reveal that local governments reduced their subsidies to public hospitals by an average
of $100 for every $100 in DSH funds received, so that total revenues at these facilities did not
increase. Private for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals used their DSH revenues primarily to
increase their holdings of financial assets, rather than improve medical care quality for the poor. I
therefore reject the theory that the decision-makers in not-for-profit hospitals are more altruistic than
their counterparts in profit-maximizing firms.
Taken together, these two sets of results strongly support the soft budget constraint theory
of government-owned institutions. Public hospitals behaved much differently from private facilities
when their financial incentives changed and their revenues increased because they did not have a
legal right to retain their own profits. My findings reveal that the distinction between public and
private firms in the hospital market is much greater than is the difference between private for-profit
and private not-for-profit organizations.
In the final empirical section, I examine the effect of the change in hospital behavior on
health outcomes. Because public hospitals received none of the DSH funds intended for them and
private firms used their funds primarily to increase their holdings of financial assets, the large
5

increase in public medical spending did not lead to a significant increase in medical care inputs.
Despite this, the reallocation of patients caused by the DSH program may have affected patient
outcomes. In examining this issue, I show that areas in which a substantial share of Medicaidinsured patients were reallocated from public to private hospitals did not have better improvements
in health outcomes, as measured by changes in infant mortality rates. This finding suggests that the
substantial increase in public medical spending created by the DSH program has not improved
health outcomes for low-income individuals.
II. Theories of Organizational Behavior
A. The Ease of Appropriating Profits
One theory of organizational behavior states that the critical difference between private forprofit, private not-for-profit, and government-owned hospitals is the ease with which each
institution’s decision makers can appropriate profits. Glaeser and Shleifer [1998] argue that,
because not-for-profit organizations are barred from distributing residual earnings to individuals
who exercise control over the firm [Hansmann 1980], profits are less valuable to these institutions
than they are to private for-profit firms. Instead of keeping the profits, the not-for-profit decision
maker uses them to increase firm perquisites, which are less valuable than cash.
If this theory is true, and if manager effort is costly, then a for-profit hospital will be more
responsive than a not-for-profit facility to a new profitable opportunity.1 Patients who are, on the
margin, just profitable enough to offset a for-profit manager’s effort costs, will not be attractive to
the not-for-profit decision maker. This theory does not imply that not-for-profit behavior will be
unaffected by changes in incentives, but simply that profit-maximizing hospitals will be more

1

As Hansmann [1996] points out, not-for-profit hospitals are not representative of the
not-for-profit sector as a whole. They receive fewer donations and less volunteer labor than the
typical not-for-profit firm. They are, however, the largest employer in this sector - hospital
employees account for approximately 40% of all non-volunteer labor in not-for-profit firms.
6

responsive.2
Because compensation in government-owned organizations is also strictly regulated, this
theory predicts that a profit-maximizing hospital will be more responsive than one owned by the
government to a change in incentives, but does not make a strong prediction about the difference
between the not-for-profit and public firms’ responsiveness. According to this theory, the decisionmakers in the three types of hospitals may have identical preferences, but react differently to
financial incentives because of different constraints on the distribution of hospital profits.
B. Altruistic Decision-Makers
An alternative explanation for the difference between the three types of firms is that the
decision-makers in not-for-profit and government-owned organizations have different preferences
from their counterparts in profit-maximizing firms.3 Previous work on not-for-profit organizations
has emphasized the altruistic nature of their decision-makers [Rose-Ackerman 1996] or that these
individuals deviate from profit-maximizing behavior [Lakdawalla-Philipson 1998].4 Managers in
government-owned firms may have a strong sense of mission [Wilson 1989] and aim to maximize
the well-being of the people served by their organization.
If the decision-makers in private not-for-profit and government-owned hospitals have
motives that are significantly different from the motives of managers in profit-maximizing
organizations, then these hospitals will behave quite differently in response to an exogenous increase
in their revenues. For example, a not-for-profit or government-owned hospital that values the well-

2

The magnitude of this difference will presumably increase as effort costs become a more
important factor.
3

Weisbrod [1988] calls this “managerial sorting”.

4

Work by Newhouse [1970] and Feldstein [1973] suggests that the decision-maker in a
not-for-profit hospital maximizes an objective function that positively values both the quality
and the quantity of medical services provided, subject to a breakeven constraint.
7

being of indigent patients more than a profit-maximizing hospital will use some of the windfall to
provide better medical care for these individuals.
As was true for the previous one, this theory does not make a clear prediction about the
difference between private not-for-profit and government-owned institutions. The decision-makers
in both types of organizations may react like profit-maximizing hospitals to changes in their
financial incentives, but will be more inclined to use increased revenues to improve medical care
for the poor.
C. Soft Budget Constraint
Unlike the previous two, the final theory emphasizes differences in the legal rights of private
and public organizations. As has been argued by Kornai [1980], government-owned firms may have
softer financial incentives than do private companies if they are owned by another public institution.
Local governments may, for example, reduce their subsidies to public hospitals one-for-one as these
facilities’ revenues increase.5
If this theory is true, then government-owned hospitals will be significantly less responsive
than private facilities to changes in financial incentives, and exogenous increases in their revenues
will be taken by the local governments that own them. Both private for-profit and private not-forprofit hospitals will be able to retain their windfalls, and because of this the behavior of both types
of private firms should be quite different from the behavior of government-owned organizations.
III. Background
A. Health Care for the Poor
Low-income individuals typically do not have private health insurance. More than 47
percent of non-elderly individuals with family incomes below the poverty line received public health
insurance through the federal-state Medicaid program in 1990. An additional 33 percent had no
5

Typically the soft budget constraint literature refers to the case in which public firms
will be “bailed out” by other government agencies.
8

health insurance during that same year. The corresponding percentages for non-elderly individuals
with family income greater than twice the poverty line were 2 and 9 percent [EBRI, 1991]. Thus
the nine million Californians who were either Medicaid-insured or without health insurance were
disproportionately poor.
Hospitals have historically provided a substantial amount of medical care to the indigent.
More than 30 percent of the patients admitted to a California hospital in 1990 were Medicaidinsured or uninsured. At that time, a hospital that contracted with the state to treat Medicaid patients
was reimbursed on a per-diem basis.6 Estimates suggest that hospital Medicaid revenues covered
only 80 percent of the costs of treating those patients in 1990. Because they were typically unable
to pay for their medical care, uninsured patients were even less profitable to treat. Therefore, the
average costs of caring for the indigent exceeded the payments that hospitals received to treat them.
Many hospitals used profits from non-indigent patients to cross-subsidize medical care for the poor
[Aaron 1991]. The hospitals that served primarily indigent patients were unable to do this.
B. The Disproportionate Share Program
To address this problem, the U.S. Congress modified the Medicaid program to encourage
states to improve medical care at hospitals that had been providing a disproportionate amount of
health care to the poor. Each state was free to design its own Disproportionate Share Program
(DSH), and would receive federal matching dollars if its program was approved by the federal
Health Care Financing Administration. Spending on DSH programs nationwide grew from less than
$1 billion in 1989 to almost $18 billion by 1992 [Coughlin, et al 1992].
This federal legislation led to the creation of California’s DSH program in late 1990. Each
of the 23 counties with a county-owned safety-net provider was required to contribute money to
6

Starting in 1985, these rates were competitively contracted. Once a California hospital
has a Medicaid contract, that rate will prevail until either (1) the hospital terminates its contract
or (2) the hospital requests an increase and the Medical Assistance Commission agrees to this
increase. Approximately 60 percent of California’s hospitals had a Medicaid contract in 1990.
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California’s DSH fund on an annual basis, which was then matched dollar-for-dollar by the federal
government. These funds were then distributed directly to hospitals that had a “low-income
number” of 25 percent or more. The low-income number was defined to be the percentage of a
hospital’s total costs that were attributable to Medicaid and uninsured patients. A hospital that
qualified in year t received a DSH per-diem for all of its Medicaid patient days in year t+1. The perdiem rate increased non-linearly with the low-income number, rising from $240 to a maximum of
$1052. This relationship is shown in Figure I.
The DSH program had two main effects. First, it significantly increased the revenues of
those hospitals with a low-income number greater than 25 percent. Second, it enhanced hospitals’
financial incentives to treat low-income patients. This second effect was especially great for those
facilities above the 25 percent threshold or slightly below it. By attracting a few more indigent
patients, a hospital slightly below the threshold with an average number of Medicaid days would
receive $3 million if it qualified in the following year. For hospitals that already had qualified, the
payments received for each additional Medicaid patient increased by at least 40 percent.
A hospital that did not qualify could attempt to reach the 25 percent threshold by increasing
its provision of care to the Medicaid-insured or the uninsured. All else equal, a Medicaid patient
was much more financially attractive, because the hospital received both the original Medicaid perdiem and the DSH per-diem for each Medicaid patient day.
C. Data
Data for all California hospitals and the patients served by these facilities are available
annually from the state’s Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD). The
patient-level data set contains detailed information about every individual admitted to or born in a
California hospital. The hospital-level data provides information regarding each hospital’s finances,
services, employees, and type of ownership. In the empirical analysis I focus on the 397 general
acute care hospitals that were in operation in California from 1987 through 1995. Within this group,
10

85 were government-owned and operated in 1987, while the other 312 were privately owned.7 Table
I reveals that the majority of patients at government-owned facilities were Medicaid-insured or
without health insurance. In contrast, less than 25 percent of the patients at private not-for-profit
and private for-profit facilities were indigent.
IV. The Reallocation of Low-Income Patients
Hospitals had an increased financial incentive to admit more Medicaid patients after the
introduction of the DSH program. After this program was implemented in 1990, public hospitals
experienced a substantial decline in the share of Medicaid-insured individuals attending their
facilities. Before DSH, more than 42 percent of the state’s Medicaid patients were treated at a
government-owned facility, versus only 29 percent five years later. Table II reveals that this decline
reflects an increase in the share of Medicaid patients attending both private for-profit and private
not-for-profit facilities. During this same time period, the share of uninsured patients attending
public hospitals increased significantly, from 38 percent in 1990 to 48 percent in 1995.
This reallocation of low-income patients coincided with a substantial increase in total DSH
funds received both by private for-profit and private not-for-profit hospitals. Table III lists DSH
payments by type of hospital for the 1991 and 1996 fiscal years (based on 1990 and 1995 Medicaid
days, respectively), and shows that private hospitals increased their DSH payments more than
threefold within five years, while public hospitals’ DSH funds declined substantially. These data
strongly suggest that both types of private hospitals responded more aggressively to the change in
incentives than did government-owned institutions.
In the analysis that follows, I test the theory that not-for-profit hospitals are less responsive
than profit-maximizing firms to changes in financial incentives because of their non-distribution

7

Approximately 7 percent of the hospitals in the sample converted to a different
ownership type between 1987 and 1995. The most common conversions were not-for-profit to
for-profit (10), for-profit to not-for-profit (9), and public to not-for-profit (6).
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constraint. This section also performs a preliminary test of the soft budget constraint theory, which
emphasizes the incentive problem of government-owned institutions.
A. Controlling for the Medicaid Eligibility Expansions
To compare the responsiveness of hospitals to the DSH program, I examine the change in
each hospital’s number of low-income patients. I divide indigent patients into two categories - those
covered by Medicaid and those patients without health insurance. The DSH program significantly
increased the profitability of treating Medicaid patients, while leaving the incentive to treat
uninsured patients virtually unchanged.
The DSH program is not the only major change in public medical programs for the indigent
during this time period. Expansions in Medicaid eligibility, which mainly took place from 1987 to
1993, are another important factor to consider.8 Figure II reveals that the percentage of hospital
patients insured by Medicaid rose substantially during the time period of interest, from 16 percent
in 1987 to 26 percent by 1993. During this same period, the share that were without health
insurance fell from more than 9 percent to less than 6 percent.9 Given the magnitude of the changes
in Medicaid eligibility, it is important to control for this potentially confounding factor when
examining the behavioral response of hospitals to the DSH financial incentives. A hospital may
appear to have responded to the DSH incentives when it actually had more Medicaid admissions
simply because a greater fraction of its pre-DSH patients were now Medicaid-eligible.

8

In 1986, the federal government passed legislation that led to substantial increases in the
number of individuals insured by Medicaid. Prior to these expansions, single women with
children who had incomes close to or below the poverty line were insured by this program. By
1993, eligibility had been extended to all female-headed households in California with incomes
below 185 percent of the poverty line.
9

The decline in the share of patients without health insurance is much smaller than is the
increase in the share covered by Medicaid. This is consistent with the results of Cutler and
Gruber [1996], who found that the Medicaid eligibility expansions partially crowded out private
insurance coverage.
12

To control for the effect of the eligibility expansions on each hospital’s patient mix, I use
patient demographic and zipcode of residence data to estimate the number of Medicaid patients that
a hospital would have admitted in each year, absent any change in its patient mix from a base year.10
Hospitals that served patients from predominantly wealthy zipcodes in the base year have relatively
small predicted Medicaid numbers. Alternatively, those hospitals that served patients from areas
that were disproportionately affected by the expansions have large predicted increases. I construct
a similar measure to predict the number of uninsured patients that a hospital would treat in each
year.
B. Reallocation of Medicaid Patients from Public to Private Hospitals
Using 1990 as a base year, I calculate the predicted change in the number of Medicaid and
uninsured patients from 1990 to 1995 at each hospital. I then use these predicted changes,
ΔMCPRED95,90 and ΔUNPRED95,90, to explain the actual changes, ΔMEDICAID95,90 and
ΔUNINSURED95,90. Summary statistics for these variables are provided in Table IV.
Columns one and three of Table V summarize the results for both types of indigent patients.
The significantly negative estimate of -0.742 on the ΔMCPRED95,90 coefficient contrasts sharply
with the 0.962 estimate for ΔUNPRED95,90. This result suggests that substantial reallocation of
Medicaid patients occurred from 1990 to 1995, while the uninsured tended to remain at the same
hospitals. The significantly positive estimate of 0.452 on the ΔMCPRED90,85 coefficient in the fifth
specification shows that Medicaid patients were not being reallocated nearly as much11 prior to 1990.
10

The construction of this estimated measure is described in the appendix.

Unlike the estimate for the ΔUNINSURED95,90 coefficient, this estimate is significantly
different from one, suggesting that some reallocation of Medicaid patients was occurring. This
is presumably due to changes in Medicaid contract arrangements. Approximately 50 general
acute care hospitals terminated their Medicaid contracts between 1986 and 1990, while more
than 25 facilities signed new contracts [CMAC 1996]. Despite this, it is clear that the predicted
change in Medicaid patients has much more predictive power from 1985-1990 than during the
1990-1995 period. This is consistent with the view that competition for Medicaid patients
11
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The second and fourth specifications include dummy variables for a hospital’s type of
ownership. Controlling for a hospital’s predicted change in patient mix, publicly-owned hospitals
experienced a significantly smaller increase in their number of Medicaid patients and a significantly
greater increase in their number of uninsured patients than did privately-owned facilities from 1990
to 1995.
Taken together, these results are consistent with the view that, in response to the change in
financial incentives caused by DSH, private hospitals cream-skimmed the newly profitable Medicaid
patients from government-owned facilities. The similarity between the two types of private
hospitals does not support the theory that private not-for-profit hospitals are less responsive to
financial incentives because of their non-distribution constraint. The next section provides a cleaner
test of this theory.
C. Are Not-for-Profit Hospitals Less Responsive to Incentives than Profit-Maximizing Firms?
I next utilize several years of hospital data to examine whether this reallocation was a
response to the DSH financial incentives or was instead caused by other factors. Hospitals that were
above the 25 percent threshold or slightly below it when DSH was first introduced had a strong
incentive to admit more Medicaid patients. By attracting a relatively small number of publicly
insured patients, a hospital with a low-income number slightly below 25 percent could have
qualified for DSH reimbursement for all of its Medicaid patient days. Similarly, the marginal
revenue associated with a Medicaid patient increased by 40 percent or more for hospitals that
already had qualified. If DSH caused the reallocation of Medicaid patients described above, then
one would expect hospitals above the 25 percent threshold or slightly below it to have admitted
significantly more Medicaid patients after 1990.
To investigate this issue, I use eight years (1988-1995) of hospital data in running

intensified after 1990.
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specifications of the following form:
(1) MEDICAID jt = β 0 BEDS jt + β1 MCPRED jt + β 2 OBSTET jt + β 3 OWN jt + β 4 LOW > 15 j ,t − 1 +

β 5 DSH t * OWN jt + β 6 DSH t * LOW > 15 j ,t −1 + β 7 DSH t * LOW > 15 j ,t −1 * OWN jt + α j + λ t + ε jt

Here MEDICAIDjt represents the number of Medicaid patients admitted by hospital j in year t, αj
is a hospital fixed effect, and λt is a year fixed effect. The variable LOW>15t-1 takes on a value of
one if a hospital’s low-income number was greater than 15 percent in year t-1.12 DSHt * LOW>15t-1
is defined similarly but equals zero for all hospitals from 1988-1990. I then interact this variable
with a hospital’s type of ownership, OWN, to examine whether there were significant differences
across ownership types in response to the increased financial incentives to treat Medicaid patients.
I interact a hospital’s ownership type with a DSH dummy to control for other factors that were
differentially affecting each of the three types of hospitals in the post-DSH period. MCPREDjt is
hospital j’s predicted number of Medicaid patients in year t, using 1987 as the base year. I also
include variables to control for a hospital’s service mix (OBSTET) and its size (BEDS). Summary
statistics for all of these variables are provided in Table IV.
The first and third specifications of Table VI show that, consistent with the results from
Table V, there was substantial reallocation of Medicaid patients but relatively little reallocation of
the uninsured during the time period of interest. In the second specification I introduce the
explanatory variables described above. As the coefficients on the DSHt * LOW>15t-1 coefficients
show, private for-profit and not-for-profit hospitals responded significantly more aggressively to the
DSH financial incentives than did government-owned firms. There is no corresponding difference
between the two types of private hospitals, as the insignificant estimate on the DSHt * NFPt *
LOW>15t-1 coefficient shows. Private hospitals that were above the DSH threshold or slightly below
12

Here the time index is t-1, reflecting the fact that it is the previous year’s low-income
number that determines the DSH reimbursement for the current year’s Medicaid patients.
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it admitted significantly more Medicaid patients than did public ones after the introduction of DSH.
The fourth specification reveals that there was no corresponding difference for uninsured patients.
Private for-profit and private not-for-profit hospitals cream-skimmed those patients whose
profitability increased significantly after the introduction of the DSH program, while reducing their
share of care to unprofitable indigent patients. The two types of private hospitals were similarly
responsive to the change in incentives, and both were significantly more responsive than
government-owned institutions.
Based on these results, I reject the theory that the non-distribution constraint in not-for-profit
hospitals leads these firms to be less responsive than profit-maximizing firms to changes in financial
incentives. This set of results also provides preliminary support for the soft budget constraint
theory, which emphasizes the incentive problem of firms owned by the government.
V. The Use of Cash Windfalls
Those hospitals that qualified for DSH in the first year of the program enjoyed a substantial
increase in their total revenues. Immediately prior to DSH, these organizations had total revenues
of $3.87 billion. Total DSH payments to them in the first year of the program were more than $1.70
billion. Qualifying hospitals therefore enjoyed a plausibly exogenous increase of 45 percent in their
revenues after the introduction of DSH.
The soft budget constraint theory described above implies that local governments should
have taken the cash windfalls received by public hospitals. The altruism theory predicts that
decision-makers in private not-for-profit firms would have been more inclined than profitmaximizing managers to use their cash windfalls to improve medical care for low-income
individuals.

In this section, I use hospital financial data to test both of these theories of

organizational behavior.
A. Do Public Hospitals Have a Soft Budget Constraint?
I first estimate the effect of DSH funds on changes in hospital Medicaid revenue, government
16

subsidies, and total revenues.13 I investigate changes in these variables from before DSH was
introduced to afterwards. Instead of focusing on year-to-year variation, I use averages in the four
years after the program as my measures of post-DSH variables of interest, because of substantial
fluctuations across hospitals in the exact timing of DSH payments. Table VII provides summary
statistics for the variables that are defined in this section. All dollar amounts are inflation-adjusted
to 1990 dollars.
I use average DSH payments from 1992 to 1995 as one of my explanatory variables,14 which
I then interact with the hospital’s ownership type to construct the variables (DSH * FOR-PROFIT)
and (DSH * PUBLIC). I also include dummy variables for a hospital’s type of ownership in running
the following specification:
(2) Δ REVENUES j = α + β1 * DSH j + β2 *( DSH j * FOR − PROFITj ) + β3 *( DSH j * PUBLIC j )
+ μ1 * FOR − PROFITj + μ2 * PUBLIC j + λ * BEDS j + ε j

In Table VIII, I present the results from several OLS specifications of this type. Each column has
a different dependent variable. The sum of the dependent variables in the first three specifications
(changes in Medicaid revenues, subsidies, and other revenues) is equal to the dependent variable in
the fourth, which is the change in total hospital revenues.
The first column reveals that for-profit, not-for-profit, and government-owned hospitals that
received DSH funds between 1992 and 1995 all witnessed significant increases in their total
Medicaid revenues. There are two reasons that, in all three cases, the estimates are greater than one.

13

There are only 371 (instead of 397) hospitals included in these regressions because 26
of the hospitals do not report financial information. Hospitals owned by the Kaiser corporation
(25 of the 26 not reporting) are not required to report financial information to OSHPD. None of
the excluded hospitals qualified for DSH funds in any year.
14

I omit 1991 because it is a transition year - some hospitals that qualified initially receive
some of their payments in 1991, whereas others do not receive their first payment until 1992.
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First, hospitals that qualified for DSH were also being affected by the Medicaid eligibility
expansions. A greater fraction of their patients, even without any reallocation across hospitals, were
insured by this government program. Second, hospitals that qualified for DSH were relatively
successful in attracting additional Medicaid patients. This was especially true for private hospitals,
as the results in the previous section demonstrated. The Medicaid revenues of qualifying hospitals
should therefore have increased by more than their DSH funds alone would imply.
The dependent variable in the second specification is the change in local government
subsidies, Δ SUBSIDIES.15 As the significantly negative estimate of -1.04 on the (DSH * PUBLIC)
variable shows, those public hospitals that qualified for DSH experienced substantial declines in
their subsidies. The estimate actually suggests that local governments took all of the DSH funds
from public hospitals by reducing their subsidies one-for-one. This result provides strong support
for the soft budget constraint theory of government-owned institutions. Because private hospitals
received virtually no subsidies from local governments, it is not surprising that the coefficient
estimates on the other two DSH coefficients are insignificantly different from zero.
The next column uses as its dependent variable the change in all other revenues, Δ OTHER
REV. The point estimate on the DSH coefficient is significantly negative, suggesting that not-forprofit hospitals reduced their care to other types of patients to increase the number of Medicaid
patients that they served.16 There is no such significant relationship between DSH funds and other
revenues for the other two hospital types.

15

Prior to the creation of DSH, county subsidies accounted for approximately 30 percent
of the revenues of those public hospitals that qualified for DSH.
16

It is worth noting that average occupancy rates were greater in private not-for-profit
hospitals than in the other two types of facilities. Thus it is plausible that private not-for-profit
hospitals had to reduce care to other types of patients to attract sufficient Medicaid patients,
while for-profit facilities had sufficient excess capacity to avoid doing this. Additionally,
Medicaid expansions crowded out some private insurance coverage, suggesting that revenues
from private sources would fall somewhat as Medicaid revenues increased.
18

The dependent variable in the fourth specification, Δ REVENUES, is the sum of the
dependent variables in the first four columns. Both types of private hospitals experienced significant
increases in their revenues, as the coefficients on the DSH and (DSH * FOR-PROFIT) coefficients
show. Because of the crowdout of intergovernmental funds, safety-net hospitals that qualified for
DSH had no significant increase in their revenues.
The results in this section show that local governments took the DSH funds that were given
to publicly-owned hospitals, leaving these facilities with no additional revenues. This result
supports the theory that organizations owned by the government do have a soft budget constraint.
The next section tests whether the decision-makers in private not-for-profit hospitals are more
altruistic than their profit-maximizing counterparts by examining how private hospitals used their
cash windfalls.
B. Are Not-for-Profit Hospitals More Altruistic than Profit-Maximizing Firms?
If the decision-makers in private not-for-profit hospitals value the welfare of their patients
significantly more than do the managers in profit-maximizing firms, then these two types of
hospitals should behave quite differently in response to an exogenous increase in their revenues.
For example, an altruistic hospital administrator could have used their DSH funds to provide more
medical care to their indigent patients. Profit-maximizing firms would only have done this if it was
financially attractive to do so. To test whether not-for-profit managers are more altruistic than forprofit ones, I examine in this section how these two types of private hospitals used the increased
revenues that they received from the DSH program.17
I first explore the effect of the cash windfalls on total hospital costs. Table IX provides the
results of regressions that explain changes in hospital revenues, costs, and profits as a function of
their total DSH funds received. The second column reveals that, for all three types of hospitals,
17

Because local governments took the DSH funds intended for public hospitals, I am
unable to perform a similar test regarding the preferences of the public hospital decision-makers.
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changes in hospital costs, ΔCOSTS, are not significantly related to revenues received from the DSH
program. Additionally, there is no significant difference between the implied effect of DSH funds
on hospital costs for the private not-for-profit and for-profit facilities. Given that local governments
took most of the DSH funds from public hospitals, it is not surprising that costs did not increase with
additional DSH funds at these medical care providers.
The third column summarizes the results with changes in hospital profits, ΔNET INCOME,
as the dependent variable. The significant estimate of 1.16 on the DSH coefficient suggests that notfor-profit hospitals’ net income increased approximately one-for-one with their DSH payments.
This effect is not significantly different from the corresponding effect on the profits of for-profit
hospitals, as the insignificant estimate of 0.15 on the (DSH * FOR-PROFIT) coefficient shows.
DSH funds did not have a significant effect on the net income of publicly-owned hospitals.
Not-for-profit firms are, by law, barred from distributing cash profits to any individuals that
exercise control over the firm [Hansmann, 1980]. Therefore, one would expect to see increases in
their accounting profits translate, essentially one-for-one, into increases in their net worth (total
assets minus total liabilities). This would be the case if a hospital used its profits to invest in new
equipment, pay off long-term debt, or invest in the stock market. For-profit hospitals could have
retained the funds within the facility, but were also free to repatriate the profits to the parent
company,18 distribute the profits to members of a partnership, or give the money to shareholders in
the form of dividends. The gain in their net worth might therefore have been less than one-for-one.
In Table X I investigate the effect of DSH money on changes in hospitals’ total net worth.
I then divide changes in net worth into two components: changes in physical assets (net property,
plant, and equipment + current and planned construction) and changes in net financial assets (the
difference between net worth and physical assets). The first column shows estimates of the effect

18

If the hospital is part of a corporation.
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of total DSH funds, DSHSUM,19 on the change in hospital net worth, Δ NET WORTH.
The results in the first column reveal that those private hospitals that qualified for DSH funds
experienced significant increases in net worth during the time period of interest. The coefficient
estimates suggest that, for every $100 received in DSH funds from 1992 through 1995, not-for-profit
hospitals’ net worth increased by $85 while for-profits’ increased by $100. In both cases, the
coefficient estimates are significantly different from zero and insignificantly different from one.
Furthermore, the two estimates are not significantly different from one another. As one would
expect, public hospitals did not enjoy a significant increase in their net worth. The results for this
specification imply that both types of private hospitals kept their cash windfalls inside of the firm.20
The second and third columns of Table X reveal that private for-profit and not-for-profit
hospitals used their cash windfalls quite similarly. In the second column, I explain changes in
hospitals’ total physical assets, Δ NET PPE, since the introduction of DSH.21 The statistically
insignificant estimates on the DSHSUM and (DSHSUM * FOR-PROFIT) coefficients indicate that
neither type of private hospitals used their increased revenues to finance purchases of new
equipment or begin new construction. Once again, the estimated effects for not-for-profit and forprofit hospitals are not significantly different from one another.
As the estimates on the DSHSUM and (DSHSUM * FOR-PROFIT) coefficients in the third
specification show, both not-for-profit and for-profit hospitals used most of their cash windfalls to
increase their holdings of financial assets. The significant estimates are insignificantly different
from one another, and one cannot reject the hypothesis that all of the DSH funds received by private

19

I use total DSH funds because here I am explaining a stock rather than a flow.
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The result for private for-profit hospitals is broadly consistent with the results of
Blanchard, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer [1994]. These authors found that investor-owned
firms in other industries that received cash windfalls did not distribute the funds to shareholders.
21

This measure of PPE also includes any current or planned construction.
21

hospitals were used to increase the facilities’ financial assets. Thus the observable response of notfor-profit and for-profit hospitals to exogenous increases in their revenues was quite similar.
The increase in net worth for private hospitals that qualified for DSH was substantial. From
1985 to 1990, the total net worth of these organizations remained steady at approximately 500
million dollars. From 1990 to 1995, their net worth rose to nearly 1.10 billion dollars. DSH funds
apparently accounted for virtually all of this increase, as these facilities received 600 million dollars
in DSH payments during this time period.
The results presented in this section do not support the hypothesis that the decision-makers
in private not-for-profit hospitals have motives that are much different from their for-profit
counterparts’. Not-for-profit hospitals were no more likely to use their DSH funds to improve
medical care quality for the poor, as profits increased one-for-one with the cash windfalls that they
received. Rather than using these profits to invest in new property, plant, and equipment, not-forprofit hospitals simply increased their holdings of financial assets.
This is consistent with the results from the previous section, which showed that both types
of private firms increased their provision of care to the newly profitable Medicaid patients while
reducing their care to the unprofitable patients without health insurance. These results lead me to
reject the theory that the decision-makers in private not-for-profit hospitals are more altruistic than
are the managers in profit-maximizing firms.
VI. The Impact on Health Outcomes
Despite the lack of evidence for any effect of DSH funds on inputs to health care production,
the change in hospital behavior caused by the DSH program may have affected health outcomes.
Private hospitals that admitted more indigent patients after the introduction of DSH may have
offered better medical care than government-owned facilities.

Alternatively, the increased

competition from private firms may have spurred public hospitals to improve the quality of their
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services.22
In this section I examine whether health outcomes improved more in those places where the
most reallocation of Medicaid patients from public to private hospitals occurred. Rather than
examining health outcomes for all indigent patients, I focus solely on infant mortality rates. There
are three reasons for doing this. First, newborn infants are, by a significant margin, the most
common type of Medicaid-insured hospital patient, with births accounting for more than 60% of all
Medicaid discharges.23 Second, Medicaid-insured newborns were more likely than other Medicaid
patients to be reallocated from public to private hospitals.24 Third, previous work has shown that
infant mortality rates are particularly sensitive to changes in health care quality [Currie and Gruber
1996]. Newborn infants are therefore the group whose health outcomes would most likely have been
affected by hospitals’ responses to the DSH program.
In the analysis that follows, I use data on infant mortality rates within each zipcode25 in
California in 1990 and 1995, and combine this with the hospital patient data used above to run
specifications of the following form:
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Hoxby [1999] finds that competition from private schools does lead to improved
performance by public schools. Kessler and McClellan [1999] find that increases in hospital
competition are associated with improved outcomes for Medicare heart attack patients.
23

There were 814,056 Medicaid discharges in 1990. Of these, more than 500,000 were
pregnancy-related (approximately half of these were newborn infants with the rest being the
mothers who delivered the children).
24

The share of Medicaid-insured infants born in private hospitals rose from 57% in 1990
to 75% in 1995. The corresponding shares for other Medicaid patients (excluding women who
delivered the babies) were 61% and 67%.
25

The zipcode is the patient’s zipcode of residence. The data on mortality includes all
infant deaths - not only those occurring in a hospital. The mortality data does not include
information about the insurance status of the deceased. I am therefore unable to construct
Medicaid-specific mortality rates using these data. I can construct Medicaid-specific infant
mortality rates for those deaths that occur inside of the hospital (approximately 2/3 of all infant
deaths). The results reported below are quite similar if I use this measure instead.
23

(3) Δ MORTjt = a + β Δ MCPRIV jt + λ Δ MORTj , t −1 + μ Δ MCAID jt + Θ Δ LBWjt + γΔ X jt + ε jt

In this equation, ΔMORTjt measures the change in the infant mortality rate in zipcode j from 1990
to 1995. ΔMCAIDjt equals the change in the percentage of infants that were insured by the Medicaid
program within zipcode j, and ΔMCPRIVjt is the change in the number of Medicaid newborns
attending private facilities as a percentage of all babies born in that zipcode.26 Both ΔMCAIDjt and
ΔMCPRIVjt are included to disentangle the effects of expansions in Medicaid eligibility from the
reallocation of Medicaid patients from public to private hospitals. Additional explanatory variables
control for each zipcode’s pre-existing infant mortality rate trend (ΔMORTj,t-1), the change in the
percentage of babies born at low-birthweight27 (ΔLBWjt), and for changes in the demographic
characteristics of infants and their mothers. Summary statistics for these variables are provided in
Table XI.
In the first three columns of Table XII, I present results for specifications that explain
changes in infant-mortality rates as a function of the explanatory variables described above. The
first column reveals that places in which a substantial number of Medicaid newborns were
reallocated from public to private hospitals did not have significantly different changes in infant
mortality during the five-year time period of interest. Infant mortality rates fell by an average of
0.16% during this time period (from 0.75% to 0.59%), but this reduction was not significantly
associated with the reallocation of Medicaid patients from public to private hospitals.
This result is not affected by the inclusion of three additional explanatory variables in the
second specification. The significantly positive estimate on the ΔLBWjt coefficient has the expected

26

My results are similar if I define the reallocation measure to be the change in the
fraction of all newborns attending private facilities.
27

Low-birthweight babies have a relatively high mortality rate - 7.51% in 1990 versus
0.39% for other infants.
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sign - low-birthweight babies have a much greater mortality rate than do other infants. The
significant estimate of -0.3928 on ΔMORTj,t-1 reveals that counties with large reductions in infant
mortality from 1989 to 1990 had smaller reductions during the next five years, which is presumably
capturing regression to an area’s infant mortality rate trend. Areas in which Medicaid eligibility was
expanding most rapidly did not have greater declines in infant mortality than did other areas, as the
insignificant estimate on the ΔMCAIDjt coefficient shows. The third specification includes controls
for changes in the demographic characteristics of infants and their mothers, and the results remain
essentially unchanged.
One potential problem with the ΔMCPRIV measure is that the shift of Medicaid patients
from public to private hospitals may have been influenced by factors other than the DSH financial
incentives. An alternative measure would examine whether areas that received substantial funds
from DSH in the first year of the program had significantly better improvements in health outcomes
than did other areas. To construct such a measure, I calculate the average DSH funds received per
Medicaid newborn within each zipcode, assigning an amount (Dj / Mj) to each newborn delivered
at hospital j. Here Dj equals total DSH funds (in thousands of dollars) received by the hospital in
the first year of the program, and Mj is the number of Medicaid patients admitted to hospital j.28
Therefore, zipcodes that are served primarily by qualifying hospitals will have a relatively high
value for this DSHPER91 measure. Specifications four and five reveal that infants living in zipcodes
served primarily by qualifying hospitals did not have better improvements in health outcomes than
did other places.29 The coefficients for the other explanatory variables are virtually unchanged from
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Suppose that 30 Medicaid infants from zipcode Z are delivered at hospital A, and that
70 are delivered at hospital B. If hospital A received $500,000 in DSH funds and had 500 total
Medicaid discharges, and hospital B did not qualify, then DSHPER91 for this zipcode would
equal $300 (.3 * 1000 + .7 * 0).
29

The results are similar if I define DSHPER91 to be DSH funds per infant (rather than per
Medicaid infant).
25

the corresponding specification for ΔMCPRIV in column three.
These findings suggest that health outcomes for low-income individuals did not improve
despite a substantial increase in public medical spending for the indigent. Medicaid patients did
presumably derive some utility gain from the increased access to private facilities, and I cannot rule
out improvements in outcomes for other Medicaid patients. But for the reasons listed above,
Medicaid-insured newborns would have been more likely than any other group to benefit from DSH.
If California’s experience is representative of the U.S. as a whole, then the social benefit from this
$20 billion increase in public medical spending has been much smaller than its cost.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, I exploit a plausibly exogenous change in hospital financing to test three
theories of organizational behavior. I reject the theory that the non-distribution constraint on private
not-for-profit hospitals leads these organizations to be less responsive to financial incentives than
their profit-maximizing counterparts. I also reject the theory that the decision-makers in not-forprofit firms are more altruistic than the managers in for-profit firms, as not-for-profit hospitals are
no more inclined than profit-maximizing facilities to use cash windfalls to improve medical care
quality for the poor.
Instead, my results reveal that the critical difference between private for-profit, private notfor-profit, and publicly-owned firms in the hospital industry is caused by the soft budget constraint
of government-owned institutions. Public hospitals were unresponsive to financial incentives
because any increases in their revenues were taken by the local governments that own them.
Because every dollar of DSH funds crowded out one dollar of government subsidies, none of the
billions of dollars received by public hospitals resulted in improved medical care quality for the
poor.
In the final section of the paper, I explore whether the reallocation of low-income patients
from public to private hospitals caused by the DSH program improved health outcomes for this
26

group. I find that areas in which substantial reallocation occurred did not have better improvements
in health outcomes, as measured by changes in infant mortality.
Taken together, my results suggest that programs that aim to improve medical care for the
poor must be much more carefully designed if they are to benefit the indigent. This result may have
implications for other sectors (e.g. education, child care, prisons) in which more than one level of
government is involved in the financing of services, and in which public and private firms coexist.
Appendix
Calculating the Predicted Change in Medicaid and Uninsured Admissions at Each Hospital:
Hospitals are indexed by j = 1, . . . , J. Cells are indexed by k = 1, . . . , K. Each patient i is included
in cell k depending on his/her race (white, black, Hispanic, other) and zipcode of residence. Because
there are nearly 2000 zipcodes in California, the number of cells in each year is approximately 7000
(K=7000). Using 0 as a base year, define for each hospital j the share of Medicaid patients within
cell k:

s jk 0 =

n jk 0
J

∑ n jk 0
j =1

in which njkt equals the number of Medicaid-insured hospital patients from cell k admitted to hospital
j in year 0. The predicted number of Medicaid patients at hospital j (using 0 as the base year) in year
t > 0 is defined to be:
K

pred jt = ∑ s jk 0 * nkt
k =1

This measure will therefore control for changes in the probability that a patient in cell k is Medicaidinsured and for changes in the number of patients within cell k. All else equal, hospitals that in the
27

base year served patients from cells in which Medicaid eligibility was subsequently expanding will
have predicted increases. Similarly, if a hospital serves patients residing in areas where the
population subsequently declines, they will (all else equal) have predicted decreases. The predicted
number of uninsured patients for each hospital is constructed in an analagous manner.
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Table I
California Hospital Market: Summary Statistics in 1990
Ownership Type

# Hospitals

Medicaid

Uninsured

Average # Beds

Private NFP

209

15.4%

6.2%

227

Private FP

104

16.7%

7.5%

135

Public

84

44.1%

14.5%

166

Total
397
21.8%
8.2%
190
Data include general acute care hospitals that were in operation in California from 1987
through 1995. Medicaid and Uninsured represent the percentage of a hospital’s patients that were
Medicaid-insured and uninsured, respectively.

Table II
The Share of Medicaid and Uninsured Patients at Each Type of Hospital
Medicaid

Uninsured

Ownership Type

1985

1990

1995

1985

1990

1995

Private NFP

44.2%

45.1%

55.8%

37.8%

47.9%

41.5%

Private FP

14.9%

12.4%

14.9%

13.4%

14.5%

10.5%

Public
40.9%
42.5%
29.3%
48.8%
37.6%
48.0%
Data include all general acute care hospitals that were in operation in California in each year.
Values represent the percentage of Medicaid and uninsured patients at each type of hospital in 1985,
1990, and 1995.

Table III
Total DSH Payments by Type of Hospital
Ownership Type

1991

1996

Private NFP

66.0

184.0

Private FP

20.9

100.9

Public

1631.8

1471.6

Total
1718.7
1756.5
Dollar amounts are in millions. 1991 payments are based on 1990 Medicaid patient days.
1996 payments are based on 1995 Medicaid patient days.
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Table IV
Summary Statistics for the Impact of DSH Financial Incentives on Hospital Behavior
Variable

# Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

ΔMEDICAID95,90

401

342

1871

ΔMCPRED95,90

401

347

1049

ΔUNINSURED95,90

401

-216

704

ΔUNPRED95,90

401

-220

546

FOR-PROFIT90

401

.26

.44

PUBLIC90

401

.21

.41

ΔMCAID90,85

431

637

1699

ΔMCPRED90,85

431

587

2193

FOR-PROFIT85

431

.30

.46

PUBLIC85

431

.20

.40

MEDICAIDt

3171

1970

3801

MCPREDt,87

3171

1862

4971

UNINSUREDt

3171

611

1380

UNPREDt,87

3171

584

1528

LOW>15t-1

3171

.320

.466

DSHt * LOW>15t-1

3171

.230

.421

DSHt * LOW>15t-1 * NFPt

3171

.087

.283

DSHt * LOW>15t-1 * PUBLICt

3171

.090

.286

PRIVATE NFPt

3171

.530

.499

DSHt * PRIVATE NFPt

3171

.331

.471

PUBLICt

3171

.209

.406

DSHt * PUBLICt

3171

.130

.336

BEDSt

3171

191

152

OBSTETt
3171
.735
.441
Variables defined from 1990-1995 include the 401 general acute care hospitals that were in operation
from 1990-1995, while those for 1985-1990 include the 431 hospitals that were open throughout the 19851990 time period. These two sets of variables are used in the Table V specifications. The remaining variables
include eight years of data (1988-1995) for the 397 hospitals that were in operation in California from 1987
through 1995, and are used in the Table VI specifications.
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Table V
Changes in Hospitals’ Medicaid and Uninsured Admissions: 1985-1990 versus 1990-1995
ΔMEDICAID95,90

ΔMCPRED95,90

(1)

(2)

-.742***
(.081)

-.678***
(.080)

ΔUNINSURED95,90

ΔUNPRED95,90

(3)

(4)

.962***
(.043)

.984***
(.043)

ΔMCPRED90,85

ΔMEDICAID90,85
(5)

(6)

.452***
(.030)

.433***
(.031)

FOR-PROFIT

-270
(199)

34
(55)

-279*
(153)

PUBLIC

-1064***
(216)

266***
(59)

358**
(176)

CONSTANT

600
(90)

873
(116)

-5
(25)

-65
(33)

372
(69)

394
(94)

# OBSERVATIONS

401

401

401

401

431

431

R2
.173
.221
.555
.577
.341
.357
The first four specifications include the hospitals that were in operation in California from
1990-1995, while the final two include the facilities that were open throughout the 1985-1990 time
period. PUBLIC and FOR-PROFIT are dummy variables for a hospital’s type of ownership (private
not-for-profit is the omitted category). ΔMEDICAIDt+1,t equals the change in the number of
Medicaid hospital patients at a hospital from year t to t+1. ΔMCPREDt+1,t represents the predicted
change in the number of Medicaid patients, using t as the base year and the algorithm described in
the appendix. ΔUNINSUREDt+1,t and ΔUNPREDt+1,t are the corresponding variables for the actual
and predicted number of uninsured patients. Standard errors are included in parentheses.
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Table VI
Impact of DSH Incentives on Hospital Medicaid & Uninsured Admissions: 1988-1995
MEDICAIDt

MCPREDt,87

UNINSUREDt

(1)

(2)

-.129***
(.020)

-.114***
(.020)

UNPREDt,87

(3)

(4)

.906***
(.017)

.919***
(.017)

LOW>15t-1

78
(89)

-43
(32)

DSHt * LOW>15t-1

542***
(129)

6
(46)

DSHt * NFPt * LOW>15t-1

161
(139)

55
(49)

DSHt * PUBLICt * LOW>15t-1

-628***
(174)

86
(61)

PRIVATE NFPt

-29
(151)

22
(53)

DSHt * PRIVATE NFPt

199**
(88)

-51**
(31)

PUBLICt

251
(231)

-101
(82)

DSHt * PUBLICt

20
(136)

28
(48)

BEDSt

3.40***
(.69)

.34
(.25)

OBSTETt

688***
(112)

136***
(40)

# OBSERVATIONS

3171

3171

3171

3171

R2
.951
.955
.956
.957
The sample includes hospital-year observations for those hospitals operating in California from 1988
through 1995. All specifications include hospital and year fixed effects. MEDICAIDjt and UNINSUREDjt
equal the number of Medicaid and uninsured hospital patients, respectively, at hospital j in year t. MCPREDjt
and UNPREDjt represent the predicted number of Medicaid and uninsured patients, using the algorithm
described in the appendix and 1987 as the base year. DSHt equals one for the years 1991-1995, and zero
otherwise. LOW>15 equals 1 if a hospital’s low-income number is greater than 15 percent, and zero
otherwise. OBSTETSt equals one if a hospital has an obstetrics unit set up, and zero otherwise. BEDSjt
equals the number of available beds at hospital j in year t. Standard errors are included in parentheses.
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Table VII
Summary Statistics for the Impact of DSH Payments on Hospital Behavior
Variable

# Observations

Mean

Standard Deviation

Δ MEDICAID REV

371

6320

30637

Δ SUBSIDIES

371

-3671

27462

Δ OTHER REV

371

2659

10452

Δ REVENUES

371

5307

11949

Δ COSTS

371

5100

11137

Δ NET INCOME

371

208

5623

DSH

371

4596

26626

DSH * PUBLIC

371

4172

26472

DSH * FOR-PROFIT

371

103

607

Δ NET WORTH

371

5467

25754

Δ NET PPE

371

2742

15748

Δ NET FIN ASSETS

371

2725

25192

DSHSUM

371

18383

106504

DSHSUM * PUBLIC

371

16687

105888

DSHSUM * FOR-PROFIT
371
413
2429
There are only 371 hospitals in this sample because the hospitals owned by Kaiser are not
required to report financial information to California’s OSHPD. None of these facilities qualified
for DSH in any year. All dollar amounts are inflation-adjusted to 1990 dollars, and are reported in
thousands of dollars.
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Table VIII
Impact of DSH Funds on Hospital Subsidies and Revenues
Δ MEDICAID REV

Δ SUBSIDIES

Δ OTHER REV

Δ REVENUES

DSH

1.52***
(.09)

.00
(.10)

-.38*
(.22)

1.15***
(.22)

DSH * PUBLIC

-.39***
(.09)

-1.04***
(.10)

.39*
(.22)

-1.03***
(.22)

DSH * FOR-PROFIT

-.04
(.38)

.02
(.41)

.54
(.92)

.52
(.94)

PUBLIC

-935
(590)

2019***
(649)

120
(1452)

1204
(1472)

FOR-PROFIT

-86
(550)

-216
(605)

-3605***
(1354)

-3907***
(1373)

BEDS90

3.58**
(1.66)

-.57
(1.82)

13.29***
(4.08)

16.31***
(4.13)

CONSTANT

500
(480)

331
(528)

1152
(1181)

1983*
(1197)

# OBSERVATIONS

371

371

371

371

R2

.98

.97

.08

.28

Dependent variable in the first column is the change in each hospital’s Medicaid revenue.
Specifically, it equals MCAIDREV9295 - MCAIDREV90, with MCAIDREV9295 equal to average
Medicaid revenue in the 1992-1995 time period. The dependent variables in the other columns
(change in local government subsidies, change in other revenues, and change in total revenues) are
defined similarly. DSH represents the average funds from the Disproportionate Share Program from
1992-1995. Sample includes the 371 hospitals in operation in California from 1987 to 1995 that
reported revenue information in all years. Dollar amounts (in thousands) are inflation-adjusted to
1990 dollars. Standard errors are included in parentheses.
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Table IX
Impact of DSH Funds on Hospital Profits
Δ REVENUES

Δ COSTS

Δ NET INCOME

DSH

1.15***
(.22)

-.01
(.20)

1.16***
(.10)

DSH * PUBLIC

-1.03***
(.22)

.13
(.20)

-1.16***
(.10)

DSH * FOR-PROFIT

.52
(.94)

.37
(.86)

.15
(.44)

PUBLIC

1204
(1472)

1855
(1361)

-650
(693)

FOR-PROFIT

-3907***
(1373)

-3864***
(1268)

-43
(646)

BEDS90

16.31***
(4.13)

20.32***
(3.82)

-4.02**
(1.95)

CONSTANT

1983
(1197)

1373
(1106)

609
(563)

# OBSERVATIONS

371

371

371

R2
.28
.29
.28
Dependent variable in the first column is REVENUES9295 - REVENUES90, with
REVENUES9295 equal to the average revenue in the 1992-1995 time period. The dependent
variables in the other columns (the change in total costs and the change in net income) are defined
similarly. DSH represents average funds from the Disproportionate Share Program from 1992-1995.
Sample includes the 371 hospitals in operation in California from 1987 to 1995 that reported revenue
information in all years. Dollar amounts (in thousands) are inflation-adjusted to 1990 dollars.
Standard errors are included in parentheses.
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Table X
Impact of DSH Funds on Hospital Net Worth
Δ NET WORTH

Δ NET PPE

Δ NET FIN ASSETS

DSHSUM

.85***
(.12)

.01
(.08)

.85***
(.12)

DSHSUM * PUBLIC

-.92***
(.12)

-.01
(.08)

-.91***
(.12)

DSHSUM * FOR-PROFIT

.15
(.53)

-.16
(.35)

.31
(.52)

PUBLIC

4596
(3345)

6295***
(2226)

-1700
(3246)

FOR-PROFIT

2925
(3118)

359
(2075)

2566
(3025)

BEDS90

37.27***
(9.39)

18.74***
(6.25)

18.52**
(9.11)

CONSTANT

-3707
(2720)

-2208
(1810)

-1498
(2639)

# OBS

371

371

371

R2
.199
.051
.212
Dependent variable in the first column is equal to the change in hospital net worth from 1990 to 1995.
Δ NET PPE equals the change in each hospital’s net property, plant, and equipment, which also includes
current and planned construction. Δ NET FIN ASSETS equals the change in each hospital’s net financial
assets. DSHSUM represents total funds from the Disproportionate Share Program during the time period of
interest. Sample includes the 371 hospitals in operation in California from 1987 to 1995 that reported revenue
information in all years. Dollar amounts (in thousands) are inflation-adjusted to 1990 dollars. Standard errors
are included in parentheses.
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Table XI
Summary Statistics for Changes in Infant Mortality Rates at Zipcode Level
Variable

# Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Δ MORTALITY95,90

1382

-0.16%

0.71%

Δ MCPRIV95,90

1382

14.29%

10.29%

DSHPER91

1382

4.116

3.266

Δ MORTALITY90,89

1382

-0.08%

0.84%

Δ LBW95,90

1382

0.38%

1.90%

Δ MEDICAID95,90

1382

9.15%

6.51%

Δ AGE<2595,90

1382

-0.79%

3.98%

Δ AGE>3495,90

1382

2.66%

2.98%

Δ HISPANIC95,90

1382

5.11%

5.40%

1382
-0.14%
2.56%
Δ BLACK95,90
Sample includes the 1382 CA zipcodes with at least one birth in both 1990 and in 1995
and with 1990 census information.
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Table XII
Impact of Reallocation on Changes in Infant Mortality Rates
Δ MORTALITY95,90

Δ MCPRIV95,90

(1)

(2)

(3)

.0000
(.0019)

-.0005
(.0020)

.0005
(.0021)

DSHPER91

(4)

(5)

-2.4E-4
(5.8E-3)

1.5E-3
(5.3E-3)

Δ MORTALITY90,89

-.3928***
(.0198)

-.3948***
(.0199)

-.3948***
(.0199)

Δ MEDICAID95,90

.0030
(.0031)

.0026
(.0036)

.0030
(.0029)

Δ LBW95,90

.0358***
(.0089)

.0334***
(.0089)

.0332***
(.0089)

Δ HISPANIC95,90

-.0044
(.0034)

-.0044
(.0033)

Δ BLACK95,90

.0116*
(.0069)

.0116*
(.0069)

Δ AGE<2595,90

.0042
(.0046)

.0043
(.0046)

Δ AGE>3495,90

.0045
(.0061)

.0044
(.0060)
-.22***
(.04)

CONSTANT

-.16***
(.03)

-.23***
(.03)

-.22***
(.04)

# OBSERVATIONS

1382

1382

1382

1382

1382

R2
.0000
.2316
.2350
.0000
.2350
The dependent variable equals the change in the infant mortality rate in the zipcode from
1990-1995. ΔMCPRIV95,90 is the change in the number of Medicaid newborns attending private
facilities as a percentage of all newborns. DSHPER91 is the average DSH dollars (in thousands) per
Medicaid newborn in the zipcode (described further in section VI). ΔMORTALITY90,89 is the
change in the infant mortality rate from 1989 to 1990, and ΔMEDICAID95,90 equals the change in
the percentage of newborns who are Medicaid-eligible. ΔLBW95,90 is the change in the percentage
of infants born weighing less than 2500 grams. ΔHISPANIC95,90 and ΔBLACK95,90 represent the
change in the percentage of newborns who are Hispanic and black, respectively. ΔAGE<2595,90 and
ΔAGE>3495,90 equal the change in the percentage of women delivering newborns who are younger
than 25 and older than 34, respectively. Standard errors are included in parentheses.
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